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Abstract
This article provides a formal model of the value creation-appropriation dilemma in coopetition for innovation, that is, alliances among 
competing firms. The model determines the levels of cooperation that maximize the profit of each firm in an innovative coopetition agree-
ment regardless of the number of firms and their respective budget endowments dedicated to the coopetitive project. We answer the 
following questions: within an innovative coopetition agreement, will the partners cooperate more or less when their budget endowments 
change? What is the impact on profit? When is it profitable to accept a new partner into the agreement? What happens to the remaining 
firms when a partner withdraws from the agreement? We show that when the coopetitive budget of the focal firm increases, the focal firm 
allocates a larger part of this budget to value creation activities and increases its profit. In contrast, when a partnering firm increases its 
coopetitive budget, the focal firm reduces its budget for value creation activities to maintain a sufficient budget for value appropriation 
activities. We also show that the addition of a competitor with a large coopetitive budget to the innovative coopetition agreement 
decreases the cooperation of the focal firm but increases the profit of the initial partnering firms. In contrast, the exit of a partnering firm 
with a large coopetitive budget from the agreement intensifies the cooperation among the remaining firms but reduces their profit.
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I
ncreasingly more firms rely on alliances between competi-
tors to accelerate their development and foster innovation. 
Because these alliances present several particularities, a spe-
cific stream of literature has emerged around the concept of 
‘coopetition’ (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Bengtsson & 
Kock, 2000; Fernandez, Chiambaretto, Le Roy, & Czakon, 2018; 
Gnyawali & Park, 2011). Coopetition can be defined as a par-
adoxical situation in which firms compete in some activities, 
markets, or products but simultaneously cooperate regarding 
other activities. Coopetition is supposed to generate superior 
performance for the partnering firms as it combines the ben-
efits of cooperation and competition (Ritala, 2012). However, 
coopetition also generates strong tensions between the par-
ticipating firms (Fernandez, Le Roy, & Gnyawali, 2014; Tidström, 
2014), which are mainly driven by the conflict between gener-
ating shared benefits and capturing private benefits (Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2018; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). 
Nevertheless, several scholars have argued that instead of 
attempting to reduce these tensions, firms must accept and 
manage them because their outcomes can be highly beneficial 
if these tensions are managed properly (Bengtsson, Raza-Ullah, 
& Vanyushyn, 2016; Le Roy, Fernandez, & Chiambaretto, 2018; 
Le Roy & Czakon, 2016).
The ability to manage coopetition implies that firms can find 
the correct balance between value creation and value appro-
priation strategies (Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 2018; Park, 
Srivastava, & Gnyawali, 2014). Although the claim that cooper-
ative and competitive behaviors should be balanced is often 
made, few studies have analyzed in detail the nature and spe-
cifics of this balance. The existing contributions analyzing this 
balance remain mainly qualitative (Gnyawali & Park, 2011; 
Ritala & Tidström, 2014), or when quantitative assessments are 
made, they are done at the firm level and not at the coopeti-
tive agreement level (Park et al., 2014). Moreover, despite 
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several calls for further analysis of the value creation-appropri-
ation tension (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014; Chou & Zolkiewski, 
2018; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2018; Ritala & Tidström, 
2014), little academic attention has been devoted to the de-
tails of the budget allocation between cooperation and 
competition.
Our aim is therefore to provide a theoretical framework 
that allows a discussion and analysis of the determinants of the 
balance between value creation and value appropriation within 
innovative coopetition projects. To do this, we develop a for-
mal model based on a game-theoretical approach. We focus 
on allocative decisions of partners in a coopetitive agreement 
by modeling each partnering firm’s choice as a decision about 
how to allocate a given amount of their budget between a 
common creative activity and a private appropriation activity. 
That is, we focus on budget allocations that are conditional on 
being a member of the coopetitive agreement, and we do not 
consider a firm’s decision to enter or leave a coopetitive 
agreement. We frame the budget allocation strategies as a 
standard one-stage noncooperative game. Each firm chooses 
an allocation that is a best response to the budget allocation 
chosen by the other partners.
Our research differs from previous contributions regarding 
the value creation/appropriation dilemma in coopetition along 
several dimensions. First, contrary to previous articles that pro-
vide a qualitative assessment of the balance between cooper-
ative and competitive behaviors, our game-theoretical 
approach allows us to capture the strategic uncertainty that 
surrounds managers’ decisions in an innovative coopetition 
agreement. By doing this, we identify the equilibrium allocation 
of the budget for each participant involved in the agreement 
between value creation activities and value appropriation ac-
tivities. Second, while previous game-theory models were de-
composing such agreements in two phases as a two-stage 
game (compete-then-cooperate or cooperate-then-com-
pete), we adopt a single-stage approach to take into account 
the specificities stemming from the simultaneity of competition 
and cooperation in coopetition. By doing so, we provide a 
stronger analysis of the dilemma between value creation and 
appropriation by putting the tension between these two ob-
jectives in the core of the analysis. Third, contrary to previous 
research that assumed that value creation and value appropri-
ation behaviors were independent, we adopt a perspective in 
which the partnering firms have a limited budget such that al-
location decisions made for value creation are made at the 
expense of value appropriation. Fourth, consistent with a re-
cent stream of research inviting researchers to investigate coo-
petitive agreements involving more than two partners, our 
modeling allows us to analyze the value creation/appropriation 
dilemma in settings involving more than two partners with dif-
ferent sizes or budgets. Finally, in contrast to previous articles 
identifying a specific balance in a given situation, our approach 
allows us to realize some comparative statics and answer vari-
ous questions, such as the following: will the focal firm cooper-
ate more or less when its budget dedicated to coopetitive 
activities increases? What is the impact of such a change on its 
profit? What is the impact of an increase in the coopetitive 
budget of a partner firm on the focal firm’s cooperativeness 
and profit? To what extent is it profitable for firms belonging to 
an established coopetition agreement to accept a new partner 
into the agreement? What are the consequences for a firm 
that remains in the agreement if a partner withdraws from it?
We show that there is a unique Nash equilibrium budget 
allocation for each firm, which depends on the number of 
firms and their dedicated budgets. In addition, we show that 
the Nash budget allocations and profits evolve according to 
some key factors. When the focal firm’s dedicated budget (to 
the coopetitive project) increases, it allocates a larger fraction 
of it to value creation activities and increases its profit. By con-
trast, when a partnering firm increases its budget, the focal firm 
reduces its investment in value creation activities to increase its 
appropriation capacity. As the partner increases its budget 
dedicated to coopetition, the focal firm sees its Nash profit 
increase. Finally, we show that the entry of a new competitor 
into an existing coopetitive agreement reduces the focal firm’s 
investment in the coopetitive project and increases the profit 
for the initial partners only if the incomer’s coopetitive budget 
is sufficiently large. Symmetrically, the exit of a standing partner 
is profitable for the remaining firms only if the exiting partner 
has a relatively small coopetitive budget.
Our research contributes to the growing literature on coo-
petition and innovation by offering a formal model that allows 
us to study the incentives for competing firms to cooperate 
with one another to create common appropriable value. More 
precisely, we provide a theoretical analysis of the value cre-
ation/appropriation dilemma in a simultaneous coopera-
tion-competition game between heterogeneous firms. To our 
knowledge, this paper is the first to develop a formal analysis 
of this value creation/value appropriation dilemma that offers 
clear theoretical predictions for firms’ coopetitive strategies in 
a one-stage game. Our very generic model allows us not only 
to characterize the equilibrium for any fixed number of firms 
but also to study how it evolves when the structure of the 
agreement changes.
Theoretical background
Combining cooperative and competitive 
behaviors in coopetition strategies
As a growing number of firms cooperate with competitors 
(Fernandez et al., 2018), the concept of coopetition has been 
developed to analyze and understand the specificities of 
these strategies (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
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Accordingly, coopetition can be defined as “a paradoxical re-
lationship between two or more actors simultaneously in-
volved in cooperative and competitive interactions, regardless 
of whether their relationship is horizontal or vertical” 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014, p. 182). Because it combines the 
benefits of cooperative and competitive behaviors (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2000; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997), coopetition is 
expected to yield superior performance compared to other 
relational modes. Although several contributions indeed find 
a positive impact of coopetition on innovation performance 
(Bouncken & Kraus, 2013), market performance (Robert, 
Chiambaretto, Mira, & Le Roy, 2018), or stock-market perfor-
mance (Wu, Luo, Slotegraaf, & Aspara, 2015), some recent 
reviews have underlined that coopetition has a mixed impact 
in terms of performance, either from an innovation (Gast, 
Hora, Bouncken, & Kraus, 2018) or from a market perfor-
mance standpoint (Ritala, 2018).
A possible explanation of these mixed results comes from 
the presence of multiple coopetitive tensions felt at different 
levels (Fernandez et al., 2014; Tidström, 2014). Because the 
partnering firms are competitors, they have to address contra-
dictory and paradoxical incentives that force them to suffi-
ciently cooperate to create value while competing to capture 
enough value (Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016). To avoid 
self-destructive behaviors, several contributions have noted 
that coopetitors need to manage these tensions if they want 
to make it a successful strategy (Le Roy & Czakon, 2016; Le 
Roy et al., 2018). In this vein, Park et al. (2014) show that the 
firms that can find the right balance between their collabora-
tive and competitive efforts tend to exhibit higher innovation 
performance.
Specificities of value creation and value 
appropriation in coopetition
In their seminal contribution, in addition to introducing the 
term ‘coopetition’, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) under-
line the tensions related to the cooperative dimension of value 
creation and the competitive dimension of value appropria-
tion. By using the metaphor of a cake, they explain that the 
cooperative side of coopetition increases the size of the cake, 
whereas the competitive side increases the size of the slice. 
That is, tensions between cooperation and competition are 
driven by the conflict between generating shared benefits and 
capturing private benefits (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 
2018; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). It is interesting to note that 
even if the cooperative side of coopetition generates common 
benefits for the partnering firms, the allocation of the efforts 
between value creation and value appropriation activities is 
not made in concert with the coopetitors (Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2018). Consequently, each firm has to find the 
optimal budget allocation to maximize its profit (at the ex-
pense of the other partnering firms). By building on Lavie 
(2007), we define value creation as the value generated by the 
relationships with partners as they collectively pursue shared 
objectives. In contrast, value appropriation determines the rel-
ative share of the relational rents that the focal firm can 
appropriate. 
Even if partners must also decide how they will share and 
appropriate the relational rent generated by the cooperation 
in alliances between noncompetitors (Adegbesan & Higgins, 
2011) under coopetition, the value appropriation patterns are 
very different. The main specificity comes from the simultaneity 
of cooperative and competitive behaviors (Gnyawali & Ryan 
Charleton, 2018). Simultaneity can be understood in two ways. 
First, simultaneity can be understood as the fact that two firms 
cooperate in some markets, while they remain at the same 
time competitors in other markets. For instance, Le Roy and 
Fernandez (2015) emphasize how Astrium (Airbus Group) 
and Thales fully cooperated on a satellite program (Yahsat) 
while remaining in competition for other satellite markets. In 
this situation, each parent firm has to make a decision on the 
amount of budget (and engineer time) to allocate to the com-
mon project on the one hand and to the competing activity on 
the other hand. In parallel, simultaneity can be understood as 
the situation in which two firms cooperate on a joint product 
while developing, at the same time, unique knowledge, features, 
or competencies that will be used to improve the joint prod-
uct so that they will have a larger market share than their coo-
petitor. For example, Gnyawali and Park (2011) explain how 
Sony and Samsung allocated teams to develop in cooperation 
a new Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) technology for televisions 
while having in parallel other teams that worked on specific 
features that would allow Sony to develop a better final LCD 
product than Samsung. In this case, a single decision is made at 
the beginning of the product development stage to determine 
how to optimally allocate the budget (or the team members) 
between the cooperative and competitive activities.
Regardless of the simultaneity approach adopted, several 
contributions that have focused on the value creation/ap-
propriation dilemma have concluded that cooperative and 
competitive behaviors must be balanced (Bengtsson et al., 
2016; Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 2018; Le Roy et al., 2018; 
Park et al., 2014; Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2018; Ritala 
& Tidström, 2014). Most of these papers are theoretical or 
qualitative contributions such that they define balance as 
“evenness between competition and cooperation” (Gnyawali 
& Ryan Charleton, 2018, p. 2522). This concept of balance is 
quite blurry and yields general recommendations that state 
that partners must share resources and knowledge for the 
success of the common project while keeping sufficient re-
sources for themselves to remain able to differentiate their 
offer from their competitors’ offer in other projects. In that 
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vein, Gnyawali and Ryan Charleton (2018, p. 2526) conclude 
that “a firm with more intent for firm value creation may 
prevent the joint pie from reaching its full potential, while 
pursuit of joint value creation may similarly hinder firm 
benefits.”
To the best of our knowledge, the only quantitative contri-
bution addressing this question of balance in coopetitive 
agreements is a study conducted by Park et al. (2014). The 
authors of this study first argue that “balance helps to main-
tain and control the relationship and at the same time in-
creases the chances of realizing gains provided by both 
competition and collaboration” (p. 213). Accordingly, they 
expect firms that have a balanced behavior to present higher 
performance levels. Using the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) Platinum database, they show that firms that adopt a 
balanced coopetition strategy (with simultaneously a high de-
gree of competition and a high degree of cooperation) tend 
to have a superior innovation performance. However, their 
measure of “balance” raises methodological questions as it is 
a mere multiplication of the competition and cooperation 
variables that are respectively measured as the degree of 
market commonality between the two firms (for the compe-
tition variable) and the number of repeated ties between the 
two firms (for the cooperation variable). Furthermore, Park 
et al. (2014)’s investigation is made at the firm level and not 
at the dyadic (or agreement) level so that they do not actu-
ally investigate the value creation and value appropriation 
behaviors within a given coopetition agreement.
Despite several calls for further analysis of the value cre-
ation-appropriation tension in coopetition (Bengtsson & Kock, 
2014; Chou & Zolkiewski, 2018; Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2018; Ritala & Tidström, 2014), to the best of our 
knowledge, no study has investigated the details of the budget 
split between cooperation and competition within coopetition 
projects. In this research, we investigate how firms actually de-
cide to allocate their budget to cooperative or competitive 
activities in coopetition projects. By doing so, contrary to pre-
vious contributions that provide either a qualitative or firm-
level assessment of the ‘balance’ firms need to reach, we aim at 
determining precisely the balance associated with each coop-
etitive agreement and observe how this balance evolves when 
key parameters change (number of partners involved, budget 
dedicated to the coopetitive project, etc.).
However, determining the optimal budget allocation be-
tween value creation and value appropriation activities is chal-
lenging and requires a specific modeling approach.1
1. In this article, we do not aim at investigating the trade-off between coo-
petitive and private activities (which would match with the first approach 
of simultaneity). Nevertheless, we provide some discussion regarding this 
situation in Appendix 1.
Modeling the trade-off between value creation 
and value appropriation in coopetition
As explained by Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2009, 
2018), some of the theoretical underpinnings of coopetition 
are rooted in the economics literature regarding conflict and 
appropriation, particularly contest games with endogenous 
prizes (see Garfinkel & Skaperdas 2007 for a survey). This 
stream of literature, which is sometimes referred to as “Guns 
versus Butter,” was initiated by Haavelmo (1954) and was 
mainly developed by the contributions of Hirshleifer (1989, 
1991). The basic idea is that heterogeneously endowed agents 
must cooperate to produce goods jointly (e.g., butter) in a 
world of anarchy (without property rights); therefore, they 
must also privately build appropriation capacity (e.g., guns) to 
secure a share of the commonly produced goods. One of the 
striking results of this literature is the “paradox of power” 
(Hirshleifer, 1991), which equalizes the payoffs of asymmetric 
players. At equilibrium, resource heterogeneity leads poorly 
endowed agents to invest a larger share of their resources in 
producing guns rather than butter, while the well-endowed 
agents prefer the opposite allocation. The paradoxical result 
arises because the marginal return from appropriation is larger 
for poorly endowed players, whereas the marginal return from 
joint production is larger for the well-endowed. Nevertheless, 
modeling the trade-off between value creation and value ap-
propriation in coopetition requires considering several speci-
ficities of coopetition strategies.
First, models based on sequential games fail to properly cap-
ture the resource allocation dilemma inherent to coopetitive 
agreements. Such models assume a sequential ordering of co-
operation and competition: either an initial cooperative stage is 
followed by a competition stage (e.g., D’Aspremont & 
Jacquemin, 1988; Grünfeld, 2003; Kamien & Zang, 2000) or an 
initial competition stage is followed by a cooperative stage 
(Brandenburger & Stuart, 2007; Gans & Ryall, 2017; 
MacDonald  & Ryall, 2004; Panico, 2017). Let us refer to 
these  two  approaches as ‘cooperate-then-compete’ and 
‘ compete-then-cooperate’. By breaking the coopetition di-
lemma into two stages, the dilemma actually becomes cleared. 
In the cooperate-then-compete literature, duopoly players 
choose their level of output in stage 2 (conditional on total 
R&D investments in stage 1), and then solve for their individu-
ally optimum level of R&D investment in stage 1. Solving the 
game by backward induction eliminates the dilemma. In the 
compete-then-cooperate literature, players built their appropria-
tion capacity in stage 1 before bargaining in stage 2 to share a 
commonly created value. Again, by solving the game backwardly, 
the tension between appropriation capacity building (stage 1) 
and value creation (stage 2) is eliminated. Our aim is to focus 
on the dilemma between value creation and appropriation by 
putting the tension between these two objectives in the core 
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of the analysis. This tension between value creation and appro-
priation has been identified as the key issue of coopetitive 
agreements (Fernandez et al., 2014; Gnyawali & Ryan Charleton, 
2018; Ritala & Tidstrom, 2014). To enhance the saliency of the 
tension between value creation and value appropriation, we 
need to rely on single-stage noncooperative game modeling.
Second, contrary to most models, which assume unlimited 
resources or budget, we assume that firms’ budgets (or ef-
forts) are limited. During strategic planning, firms decide how 
to allocate their limited resources among value creation and 
value appropriation activities. Therefore, both types of activities 
are interdependent. As explained by Gnyawali and Ryan 
Charleton (2018, p. 2526), “past a certain point, the finite na-
ture of resources means that efforts to push joint value cre-
ation will occur at the expense of firm value creation and vice 
versa.” Accordingly, our modeling will require firms to make a 
trade-off between value creation and value appropriation ac-
tivities because of their finite budget.
Third, whereas most previous contributions considered 
partners of similar sizes or similar bargaining powers, we follow 
Panico’s (2017) advice to allow for heterogeneous power 
 positions of partners in an alliance. Recent articles have 
 emphasized an increasing number of coopetitive agreements 
between firms of different sizes (Chiambaretto, Bengtsson, 
Fernandez., & Näsholm, 2020; Hora, Gast, Kailer, Rey-Marti, & 
Mas-Tur, 2018). We therefore consider in our model partner 
firms of different sizes (measured by the heterogeneity of their 
dedicated budgets for the coopetitive project).
Finally, in contrast to most contributions that investigate 
coopetition in dyadic agreements (Dorn, Schweiger, & Albers, 
2016), we follow the invitation by Ansari, Garud, and 
Kumaraswamy (2016) and Rouyre and Fernandez (2019) to 
study the case of multilateral or multipartner coopetition in 
which more than two competitors are involved in the agree-
ment. Such configurations are particularly interesting as they 
reveal how the competitor’s behavior changes according to 
their budget allocated to the coopetitive project and their 
own agenda.
A formal model of coopetition for innovation
The setting
We define an innovative coopetition agreement (a consor-
tium or a joint venture) as a set of K competing firms (K ≥ 2) 
that simultaneously cooperate on a joint project and compete. 
This agreement can either be a traditional dyadic coopetitive 
agreement (K = 2) or a setting of multipartner coopetition 
(K ≥ 3) that involves three or more competing firms. Each of 
the K competing firms decides how to allocate its dedicated 
budget to the coopetitive project (the coopetitive budget 
hereafter) between value creation activities and value 
appropriation activities. We assume that value creation activi-
ties reflect cooperation, while value appropriation activities are 
related to competition.
Let us note that n
i
 is the dedicated budget of firm i to the 
coopetitive project. Although in real coopetitive projects, the 
resources dedicated to the coopetitive project have multiple 
dimensions, for example, money, time, skills, or technologies, for 
the purpose of our model, we assume that these dimensions 
can be converted into money and thus be considered as a 
budget. This implies that we abstract from the substitutability/
complementarity dimension of the resources by considering 
them as fungible. Considering K firms, the set of coopetitive 
budgets available to all firms for the project is the set of K-uple 
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 We denote 
α ∈i [0,1],  the share of firm i’s budget allocated to value cre-
ation in the coopetitive project.2 Firm i therefore invests 
amount a ni i of its budget in the joint project for value creation 
and keeps −1 ni i( )a for appropriation activities.
We assume that the total value created by the coopetitive 
project is equal to the sum of the investments in the coopera-
tive activities.3 The total value of the project is V i i( , ),a a-  
which is a function of firm i’s cooperative decision a
i
 and the 






V ni i j j
j
j K
( , ) .
1
a a a  (1)
We assume that −V i i( , )a a  is increasing in ia  and a − i. This 
specification implies that the partners’ budgets are 
substitutable.4
Regarding the appropriation behavior, we assume that the 
ability of firm i to appropriate value from the joint project posi-
tively depends on two types of factors: exogenous factors and 
endogenous ones. Indeed, following Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
or Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2013), we note that the 
absorptive capacity and the appropriation capability is the result 
of firm-specific exogenous factors and of endogenous factors 
2. Strictly, the extreme cases for which a firm does not cooperate at all 
α =i( 0)  or does not compete at all α =i( 1)  cannot be considered as 
coopetition according to our definition which requires simultaneous coop-
eration and competition. However, for the sake of mathematical complete-
ness, we also discuss these two extremes.
3. To account for empirical evidence that coopetition projects yield higher 
returns, a multiplicative factor can be added to our definition of the cre-
ated value without changing the results of the paper.
4. More generally, our model assumes two types of substitutability: with-
in-firm and across-partners. Within-firm substitutability refers to the allo-
cation of a firm’s budget between value creation and value appropriation, 
while across-partners substitutability refers to the interchangeability of the 
contributions to value creation.
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related to the specific agreement. The appropriation function in 
our model takes into account these two factors which we as-
sume to be independent: (1) a firm-specific and exogenous or-
ganizational capacity in appropriating the value created collectively 
(this organizational capacity represents, for instance, unique 
knowledge, features, bargaining power, strategic importance, or 
specific competencies that will be used to improve the joint 
product and obtain a larger market share than partners); and (2) 
an agreement-specific endogenous capacity that depends posi-
tively on the amount of the firm i’s budget that was not invested 
in value creation to be kept for the value appropriation. Referring 
to the theoretical literature, the firm-specific capacity is related to 
the compete-stage of the compete-then-cooperate approach, 
while the agreement-specific capacity is related to the com-
pete-stage of the cooperate-then-compete approach.
From a mathematical standpoint, the exogenous appropria-
tion capacity is expressed in relative terms to better capture 
that the focal firm’s appropriation capacity depends upon the 
appropriation capacity of the other partners. Considering K 
firms, the set of organizational appropriation characteristics of all 
firms is the K-uple vector µ µ µ µ= K( , , , ),1 2  which is divided 
by the sum of its elements such that we define the organiza-
tional appropriation capacity as the K-uple vector 












 The exogenous 
appropriation capacity of firm i increases with m
i
 and decreases 
with m
−i 
. In parallel, the endogenous ability to appropriate is pos-
itively affected by the budget that the firm does not dedicate to 
value creation, that is, α− ni i(1 ) , and negatively affected by the 
amount of the partners’ budget kept for appropriation, that is, 
α− − −ni i(1 ) .  We thus define the value appropriation capacity of 
firm i, A
i 
, as a function of the vector α α α α α α= ≡ −K i i( , , , ) ( , )1 2  
for the focal firm i. The set of possible coopetitive agreements is 
given by A  = α α{ }∈ =for i Ki, [0,1] 1, , . Let us note 
α = (0,0, ,0)0  for the null vector and a1= (1,1, ..., 1) for the 
full contribution vector. For our purpose, we rely on contest 





















































The appropriation function α α−Ai i i( , )  decreases in a i , 
which indicates the trade-off that firms have to make in terms 
of budget allocation between value creation and appropriation 
activities. This appropriation function can be seen as a way to 
model the competition between the differentiated products. 
As in any contest game, when the focal firm invests more in its 
appropriation activities, its likelihood of being chosen by con-
sumers increases such that its ‘market share’ will be larger in 
the market generated by the coopetitive project.
The profit of firm i from the coopetitive project depends on 































































 is a firm-specific parameter that is strictly positive. 
Note that for a 0 and a 1, V = 0 such that each firm makes 
zero profit from the coopetitive agreement. If a 
i
 = 1, A
i
 = 0 
and firm i makes zero profit. Therefore, a 
i
 = 1 cannot be a 
profit-maximizing solution for firm i. On the other hand, firm 
i can eventually choose a
 i
 = 0, that is, firm i can be better off 
by contributing zero to value creation and instead by appro-
priating maximally. In the next section, we discuss the condi-
tions for which such a solution arises within a coopetitive 
agreement.
Two comments about our specification of the profit func-
tions are required. First, we assume that firms do not incur 
specific fixed costs for the coopetitive project. Although fixed 
costs are relevant, we assume that such costs are associated 
with the focal firm itself rather than with the coopetitive proj-










) is exogenous, that is, these parameters are not af-
fected by the budget allocations of the coopetitive firms. From 
a dynamic perspective, this implies that the firm-specific orga-
nizational capacities to appropriate value do not change over 
the duration of the coopetitive agreement either during the 
coopetitive stage or during the competitive stage.
Balancing between value creation and value 
appropriation activities in innovative coopetition 
projects
Building on the game-theoretical approach initiated by 
Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996),5 we look for the 
5. See Okura and Carfi (2018) for a recent survey of coopetition and game 
theory.
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equilibrium in terms of value creation and value appropriation 
that maximizes the profit of each partnering firm. We there-
fore focus on the profit of the focal firm i. Obviously, because 
the firms interact with one another, the relevant equilibrium 
concept is the Nash equilibrium, where the assumption is that 
each firm chooses a strategy that is a best response to its ex-
pectations about its partners’ strategies. The Nash equilibrium 
of the model solves the following system of first-order condi-




























0, 1, , .
 (4)
The first term is firm i’s marginal return of increasing its 
share devoted to the common value creation, and the sec-
ond term is its marginal return of increasing its endogenous 
appropriation capacity. As discussed above, the first term is 
positive, and the second term is negative. Therefore, at 
equilibrium, firm i equalizes the marginal return of the value 
creation activity to the marginal return of the appropria-
tion activity.
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Solving this system provides the firms’ best reply functions 
that define the optimal share of the budget to invest in value 








































At the Nash equilibrium, we can identify the amount of the 
dedicated budget α ni i( )*  that is allocated to value creation by 
each firm and the amount that is retained for appropriating 
the common value created by the project, that is, α− ni i(1 ) .*  It 
is interesting to observe that at equilibrium, the fraction allo-
cated by firm i to common value creation is decreasing in 
other firms’ total budgets (N
−i
) and increasing in firm i’s total 
budget for the coopetitive project (n
i
). This fact has implica-
tions on firm i’s reaction to a change in the distribution of 
budgets across partners. Expression (6) shows that if n
i
 is suf-
ficiently small, α i*  could eventually become negative. By as-
sumption, however, α i*  is constrained to be non-negative. The 
corner solution α =i 0*  is chosen by firm i if its budget allo-
cated for the coopetitive project is small relative to the aggre-
gate budget of the other members. For instance, in the case of 
a dyad, from a mathematical standpoint, firm i should free-ride 
on firm j if ≤n ni j
1
3
.  Note that firm j has nevertheless an in-
centive to invest in the coopetitive project as long α >Mj j 1.  








chooses α =i 0* .
Given the equilibrium values of investment shares α i*  for 
each firm i, one can also easily compute the equilibrium profit


















Note that the profits reached by the partnering firms differ 
only because of their different exogenous and specific capacity 
to appropriate value. Therefore, under such equal capacity, the 
coopetitive project leads to the remarkable outcome that 
profits are equalized among all firms. The equilibrium outcome 
is based on the assumption that the amount of the budget al-
located by each firm to the coopetitive project is common 
knowledge – that is, the information regarding the firms’ bud-
get for coopetition is fully transparent.
Comparative statics
In this section, we investigate the impact of various param-
eters on the incentives for firm i to cooperate. More pre-
cisely, we study how the firms’ budget allocated to the 
coopetitive project and the number of firms involved in the 
agreement affect the individual decision to cooperate. We 
consider the variations of the parameter values (firm bud-
get and number of firms in the agreement) as exogenous 
shocks because our aim is not to analyze the origin of these 
variations but only their impact on the firms’ cooperative 
choice within the coopetitive agreement. The comparative 
statics of firm i’s equilibrium α πi i( , )* *  allow us to answer 
the following questions. (1) How is the budget allocation of 
firm i affected by an increase in its dedicated budget (n
i
)? 
That is, does a firm’s cooperativeness increase if its budget 
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dedicated to the coopetitive project increases? How does 
this affect its profit? (2) To what extent is it profitable to 
involve (eliminate) an additional (standing) partner in the 
coopetitive agreement? What is the corresponding impact 
on the cooperation level?
Focal firm’s budget and cooperativeness
In most alliances and coopetition agreements, partners tend to 
have different budget sizes that can be allocated to the alliance 
or coopetition projects. A very rich literature has studied the 
implications of asymmetric alliances for the degree of coopera-
tion among partners and the stability of the agreement (Vandaie 
& Zaheer, 2014; Yang, Zheng, & Zhao, 2014). However, most 
studies in the coopetition literature consider partners of equal 
sizes and therefore do not address the effect of the heterogene-
ity of partners’ size on their cooperativeness (see Hora et al. 
[2018] or Chiambaretto et  al. (2020) for recent exceptions). 
Our framework allows us to address this issue at equilibrium: 
does a larger coopetitive budget of the focal firm increase its 
propensity to cooperate in the coopetitive project?
Recall that a larger budget represents an increase in n
i
. To 
assess the impact of an increase in n
i 
on the cooperativeness of 




























A possible interpretation for the positive sign of the derivative 
relies on the fact that when the focal firm’s budget increases, it 
can create more value and enlarge the size of the market for 
the coopetitive project by investing more in cooperation while 
keeping the same share of its coopetitive budget to appropri-
ate the jointly created value. Firms with larger budgets are thus 
more willing to create value in coopetition than firms with 
more modest budgets since they know that they can appropri-
ate this value because of their larger budget to differentiate 
and distribute the final product.
This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 1a. An increase in the coopetitive budget of the focal 
firm leads to an increase in the fraction of the focal firm’s budget 
invested in value creation.
Focal firm’s budget and profit level
Regarding profit, the comparative statics allow us to establish 
that a larger coopetitive budget of the focal firm increases the 




































































































When the focal firm’s coopetitive budget becomes larger, it in-
creases the percentage of this budget allocated to the value 
creation activity. Even if the level of cooperation of the partners 









 see below), this 
effect is compensated by the joint increase in α i*  and ni. This 
trade-off between investing more budget in cooperation to cre-
ate more joint value (which consequently also benefits the 
other firms) and saving the budget for appropriation ends in 
favor of investing most of the additional budget in cooperation 
instead of competition. This leads to Proposition 1b.
Proposition 1b. An increase in the coopetitive budget of the focal 
firm increases its profit in the coopetitive agreement.
Partner firm’s budget and focal firm’s cooperativeness
We now adopt the opposite perspective and consider instead 
an increase in a partner’s coopetitive budget on the level of 
cooperation of the focal firm. When cooperating with firms 
that allocate larger budgets to the coopetition project, the 
focal firm may face different issues, especially with respect to 
appropriating the value created in the coopetitive agreement 
(Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Yang et al., 2014). To assess the impact 
on cooperativeness of the focal firm when a partner’s coope-

























The negative sign means that an increase in the budget of a 
firm i’s partner reduces the focal firm’s proportion of the bud-
get dedicated to value creation. Consequently, the focal firm 
keeps more budget to appropriate to the jointly created value. 
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Firms with smaller coopetitive budgets thus face greater chal-
lenges related to value appropriation in alliances with partners 
that have larger budgets. Keeping more budget to appropriate 
value allows firms with a lower dedicated budget to maintain 
their profitability in the coopetitive project. A firm that has less 
budget vis-à-vis other firms must save it in the cooperative 
game (value creation) to increase its market share for value 
appropriation while benefiting from the greater cooperative 
investments of the other firms (whose budgets are compara-
tively larger). We thus state the following proposition.
Proposition 2a. A uniform increase in a partner’s coopetitive budget 
reduces the focal firm’s cooperativeness.
Partner firm’s budget and focal firm’s profit level
Although an increase in the partner firm’s coopetitive budget 
reduces the focal firm’s cooperativeness, we suspect that such 
adjustment is profitable. We can show that the increase of a 
partner’s dedicated budget positively affects the focal firm’s 












































































































































This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2b. An increase in the coopetitive budget of one of the 
focal firm’s partners increases the focal firm’s profit in the coopetitive 
agreement.
In the case of the partners’ budget (at least one) becoming 
larger, the focal firm invests less in cooperation to preserve its 
monetary resources to face stronger competitors, whereas the 
partners whose budgets have increased invest more in value 
creation. The end of the adjustment process leads to an increase 
not only in the partner firm’s profit (Prop 1b) but also in the 
focal firm’s profit. From a global standpoint, a more (less) import-
ant coopetitive budget given to the firms if they are considered 
together, regardless of their distribution among the partners, 
 increases (decreases) the profit of all participating firms.
Number of partners and focal firm’s cooperativeness
Although most coopetitive agreements involve only two actors, 
one can observe an increasing number of coopetitive agree-
ments that involve more than two competing firms. Different 
contributions have emphasized the existence of “network coo-
petition” (Padula & Dagnino, 2007) or coopetition in ecosys-
tems (Gueguen, 2009). When more than two firms are involved 
in the coopetitive project, that is, in the presence of multipart-
ner coopetition, the question of the optimum set of partners 
arises. If more firms are involved, it simultaneously increases the 
budget for the joint project and the strength of competition 
among the partners (Chiambaretto & Dumez, 2016; Das & 
Teng, 2002; Heidl, Steensma, & Phelps, 2014; Lazzarini, 2007). 
The question of the optimum set of partners is therefore a 
complex issue. Here, we address a somewhat simpler issue 
about whether adding (removing) an outside (a current) part-
ner to (from) an already existing agreement positively or nega-
tively influences the profit and cooperativeness of its members. 
We first assess the impact on cooperativeness, that is, the frac-
tion of the budget allocated to value creation, from a change in 
the set of partners. We first consider the addition of a new 
partner before considering the removal of an existing partner.
The marginal impact of an additional member (the K + 1th 
firm) on the level of cooperation of partner i of the standing 
coopetitive agreement crucially depends on the newcomer’s 
level of dedicated budget. Let us compute the sign of the dif-
















































































































According to condition (13), the sign of the difference de-
pends on the coopetitive budget of the new partner. If the new 
partner’s budget is smaller (respectively larger) than some 
threshold value that depends on the overall budget of the mem-
bers of the existing agreement (N), the focal firm increases (re-
spectively decreases) its level of cooperation. Thus, by creating 
more (respectively less) value, the standing members of the 
agreement compensate for the potential loss (respectively gain) 
incurred by a larger number of partners involved in the sharing. 
If the new partner’s coopetitive budget is relatively small, the 
historical members are not threatened by its entrance in the 
agreement. Therefore, the focal firm can increase its cooperative 
investment in common value creation. However, if the new part-
ner’s coopetitive budget is relatively large, its competitive power 
threatens the value appropriation capacity of the standing part-
ners. They react by lowering their cooperative investment to 
secure sufficient appropriation capacity while counting on the 
new partner to create more value. Figure 1 represents the 
boundary percentage of N for +nK 1 that makes the other K firms 
increase or decrease their a* by standardizing N to 1.6
Two opposite effects drive the evolution of the boundary, 
namely, a budget effect (i) and a size effect (ii). Adding a new part-
ner to the agreement (i) increases the potential budget to create 











Even if K is very large, the boundary remains above 0 (K² – (K + 1) > 0 for 
all K > 1), which means that there is always at least one case where coop-
eration can increase with the number of players (as long as the K + 1th 
firm has a coopetitive budget very close to 0).
common value, which allows firms to be less cooperative (a de-
creasing) and still create more value overall, but the size effect (ii) 
also increases the number of partners that appropriate this value, 
which pushes firms to be more cooperative (increasing a) to 
create more value and maintain at least the same level of profit. In 
our case, moving from a two-firm agreement to a three-firm 
agreement makes the size effect (ii) greater than the budget effect 
(i), which is reversed when moving from a three-firm agreement 
to a four-(or more)-firm agreement. Roughly, moving from two to 
three firms represents an increase of 50% (which is relatively 
huge), while moving from three to four firms represents an in-
crease of 25%. This explains why the boundary increases between 
K = 2 and K = 3 while decreasing otherwise.
Based on these results, we state Proposition 3a.
Proposition 3a. Adding a new partner to an existing coopetitive 
agreement increases the focal firm’s cooperativeness if and only if 
the new partner’s budget is sufficiently small (i.e., below the boundary 
percentage of N displayed in Figure 1).
We can also interpret this result from the reverse perspec-
tive. What occurs if a firm exits the agreement? The corollary of 
Proposition 3a suggests that the remaining firms increase (resp. 
decrease) their cooperation levels if the exiting firm’s budget is 
larger (respectively lower) and decrease their cooperation levels 
if they lose a partner with a small coopetitive budget.
Corollary of Proposition 3a. Removing a partner from an existing 
coopetitive agreement increases the focal firm’s cooperativeness if and 
only if the exiting partner’s budget is sufficiently large (i.e., above the 
boundary percentage of N displayed in Figure 1).
Number of partners and the focal firm’s profit level
Regarding profit, it is crucial to understand the impact of add-
ing a new partner to the standing coopetitive agreement on 
the profit of the focal firm. The Nash profit is determined by 
budget α ni i*  invested in cooperation for value creation:





































































After adding a new partner to the agreement, the profit of 
the focal firm i becomes
Figure 1. Budget of the new partner in the percentage of N that 













 for the budget of the new partner +nK( )1 , which deter-
mines the increase or decrease of the other firms’ Nash cooperative 
investments α i( )* . K is the number of cooperative firms before the 
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To assess the impact of the addition of a partner on the 
Nash profit of the focal firm, let us determine the sign of 
π π+ −K Ki i( 1) ( ).* *  Observe that
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For instance, if K = 2, then the two standing firms benefit 
from cooperating with a third partner only if the new partner 
has a very large coopetitive budget >+n NK(
5
4
).1  Figure 2 
shows the evolution of this threshold as K increases. When the 
number of initial partners is small, the additional partner’s bud-
get must be very large to increase the Nash profit of the focal 
firm. The threshold appears to decrease at approximately 10% 
of N when K is approximately equal to 20 firms in the coope-
titive game. The threshold is always positive but approaches 0 
when K reaches infinity.7 Thus, when a small number of firms 
sign the coopetitive agreement, the initial partners usually do 
not have sufficient incentives to accept an additional partner, 
unless it provides a very large coopetitive budget. Conversely, 
losing a partner with a large budget decreases the profit of the 
remaining firms; however, losing a partner with a relatively 
small budget is always profitable for them.
These results allow us to formulate the following 
propositions.
Proposition 3b. Adding a new partner to a standing coopetitive 
agreement increases the Nash profit of the focal firm if and only if 
the new partner’s dedicated budget is sufficiently large (i.e., above the 
boundary percentage of N displayed in Figure 2).
Corollary of Proposition 3b. Removing a partner from an 
existing coopetitive agreement increases the focal firm’s profit if and 
only if the exiting partner’s budget is sufficiently small (i.e., below the 
boundary percentage of N displayed in Figure 2).
Before discussing the implications of these results in the fol-
lowing section, Table 1 provides a summary of the results of 
the comparative statics of the model showing whether there is 
a positive or negative relationship among the budget size of 
the focal firm, the budget size of the other partners, the entry 
or exit of a partner with a small or a large coopetitive budget 
in the agreement, and the cooperation level and profit of the 
focal firm.
Discussion
Finding the right balance between value creation 
and value appropriation in the coopetition for 
innovation
The existing literature on coopetition has emphasized the ne-
cessity to find the right balance between value creation and 
value appropriation activities to maximize the focal firm’s inno-
vation performance (Park et al., 2014; Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2018; Ritala & Tidström, 2014). However, these 
contributions remained mainly qualitative (Gnyawali & Park, 
2011; Ritala & Tidström, 2014) or when quantitative assess-
ments were made, the level of analysis was not at the agree-
ment level (Park et al., 2014). Despite several calls to investigate 
this issue more deeply, there has been a lack of research on 
how firms can find this optimal balance. Our research answers 
this call by investigating the value creation/appropriation di-
lemma in coopetition and provides several key differentiating 
contributions. First, our game-theoretical approach allows us 
to identify the equilibrium allocation of the budget for each 
7. This means that when K is very large, there is always at least one case 
where profits can increase with the number of partners if the 
K + 1th firm has a coopetitive budget very close to 0.
Figure 2. Budget of the new partner in the percentage of N that 













for the budget of the new partner +nK( )1 , which determines the in-
crease or decrease of the other firms’ Nash profit π( *). K is the num-
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participant involved in the agreement between value creation 
activities and value appropriation activities. Second, in opposi-
tion with previous contributions using a two-stage game, we 
adopt a single-stage approach to take into account the speci-
ficities stemming from the simultaneity of competition and co-
operation in coopetition. Third, we adopt a perspective in 
which the partnering firms have a limited budget such that al-
location decision made for value creation are made at the ex-
pense of value appropriation. Fourth, our modeling allows us 
to analyze the value creation/appropriation dilemma in settings 
involving more than two partners with different budgets. Finally, 
our approach allows us to realize some comparative statics 
and observe how the equilibrium evolves when the character-
istics of the agreement change.
Our research yields several key results. First, we have shown 
the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium of a coopetitive 
agreement that determines the amount of budget invested by 
each member firm in value creation activities and the budget 
kept by each firm for value appropriation activities. We show 
that the level of cooperation, that is, the total amount of bud-
get invested cooperatively, depends on the focal firm’s coope-
titive budget, the partner firms’ coopetitive budget and the 
number of partnering firms. These findings confirm the impor-
tance of the variables identified in Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen (2018) and Ritala and Tidström (2014), even if we 
go beyond these studies in clarifying their respective roles.
Second, our approach emphasizes a key outcome regarding 
the distribution of the value created by the coopetitive agree-
ment among partnering firms. At the Nash equilibrium, the 
profits of the partnering firms tend to become equalized. 
Specifically, the profits reached by the partnering firms differ 
only based on exogenous organizational appropriation factors. 
Therefore, by neglecting such exogenous differences, we ob-
tain the remarkable outcome that profits are equalized among 
all firms despite their heterogeneity in the dedicated budgets 
to the coopetitive project. The appropriation capacity mea-
sured by firms’ relative budgets explains why their opposite 
incentives (to cooperate or compete more) do not have the 
same effect on their profit. The incentive to allocate a larger 
proportion of a firm’s budget to cooperation (which increases 
value creation) is stronger for firms with large budgets than for 
firms with more modest budgets. This result is noteworthy be-
cause it shows how the very nature of coopetition contributes 
not only to generating tensions but also to regulating them by 
avoiding unequal sharing schemes (Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2018). This situation holds if every partner can ob-
serve or anticipate the total budget of the other partners 
(without having access to each individual budget). We further 
discuss this assumption in the following sections.
Understanding the impacts of the firms’ budgets 
and the number of coopeting firms on the focal 
firm’s cooperativeness and profit
Finding the optimal level of cooperation and the resulting 
profit in a coopetitive setting also requires an understanding of 
how firms’ strategic reactions evolve according to various pa-
rameters. Three variables have been investigated: the focal 
firm’s budget dedicated to the coopetitive project, the partner 
firm’s increase in its budget, and the total number of partnering 
firms.
First, we show that when the budget of the focal firm in-
creases, the amount of the budget invested cooperatively to 
create value also increases. A richer focal firm has incentives to 
foster value creation in the coopetitive project by investing a 
larger amount of its budget in cooperation while keeping the 
same amount of budget to appropriate the jointly created 
value. Richer firms are thus more willing to create value in 
coopetition than firms with lower budgets. Additionally, we 
show that when the coopetitive budget of the focal firm in-
creases, the additional value created by the focal firm increases 
its profit. In this case, more cooperation from the focal firm 
with the larger budget overcompensates for the decrease in 
the cooperation of the other partners.
Second, by adopting a symmetrical approach, we have inves-
tigated the impact of increasing the budget of a partnering firm 
Table 1. Summary of the comparative statics: changes in the cooperation level and profit according to the focal firm’s budget size, partner firms’ budget 
size, and number of partners
Focal firm
Cooperation Profit
Increase in focal firm’s budget size + +
Increase in a partner firm’s budget size – +
A firm with a large budget joins (exits) the agreement – (+) + (–)
A firm with a small budget joins (exits) the agreement + (–) – (+)
Notes: The positive and negative signs indicate, at the equilibrium, a positive or negative change in the cooperation level and profit of the focal firm or its 
partners in response to a change in the focal firm’s budget size and in its partner firms’ budget size and the entry (or exit) of a firm with a large or small 
budget in the coopetitive agreement.
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on the focal firm’s strategic reaction. Our model allows us to 
conclude that when the budget of a partner firm increases, the 
focal firm reduces its share of budget invested cooperatively 
while keeping more budget to appropriate the joint value. 
Indeed, partners with relatively smaller budgets face greater 
challenges regarding value appropriation in alliances with part-
ners that invest a lot in coopetition activities (Yang et al., 2014). 
Consequently, keeping a larger amount of the budget to appro-
priate value is the only way for smaller partners to remain prof-
itable in a coopetitive project. Regarding profits, we show that 
even if a partner firm increases its budget dedicated to the 
coopetitive project, the focal firm will also see its profit increase. 
This result contradicts several contributions on asymmetric alli-
ances that state that partnering with a large firm usually reduces 
the profit of a smaller partner (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Vandaie & 
Zaheer, 2014). We explain this contradiction by noting that 
most of these previous contributions have focused on value 
appropriation mechanisms without accounting for the added 
value of cooperating with a partner that has a larger coopetitive 
budget. Even if a smaller firm has a lower market share (com-
pared to the initial situation), it also benefits from the increased 
market size and consequently realizes more profit.
Finally, this research has shown that the impact of adding 
new members on coopetitive agreements has contrasting out-
comes for the initial partners. First, when a new member joins 
a coopetitive agreement, the focal firm invests a larger share of 
its budget cooperatively to create value only if the new part-
ner is relatively small (from a budgetary standpoint). In the 
presence of a small new partner, the focal firm invests a larger 
share of its budget to create more value and to compensate 
for the loss of total value that can be appropriated because it 
is now shared with one more firm. However, if the new part-
ner has a large budget dedicated to the coopetitive project, 
then this budget represents a threat to the focal firm regarding 
value appropriation, which leads to a downward adjustment of 
the focal firm’s investment in cooperation to keep a sufficient 
budget to maintain its market share while expecting the new 
partner to create more value, which occurs at equilibrium. 
Regarding profit, the situation is even more complicated. The 
model allows us to conclude that the focal firm’s profit in-
creases only if the new partner is sufficiently large (from a 
budgetary standpoint). The addition of a new partner makes 
sense only if it creates more value (by adding enough mone-
tary resources to the common pool) than it appropriates (by 
dividing the value with an additional partner). Thus, only a large 
partner appears to allow firms to create more value rather 
than appropriating it. Consequently, if the partnering firms de-
cide to accept a new member in the coopetitive agreement, 
then this new partner must bring a sufficiently large coopeti-
tive budget, and such a situation leads to a reduction of the 
budget cooperatively invested by the partnering firms in value 
creation.
Conclusion
Our research aimed at understanding how firms balance 
value creation and value appropriation behaviors in innova-
tive coopetition projects. More precisely, based on a formal 
framework dedicated to coopetition agreements, we investi-
gated the impacts of firms’ budget and the number of part-
ners in the coopetitive agreement on the balance between 
value creation and value appropriation strategies. In this 
sense, our article contributes to the coopetition literature by 
offering new insights into the debate concerning the value 
creation and value appropriation strategies adopted by coo-
peting firms (Ritala & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009, 2018; 
Ritala & Tidström, 2014) and the tensions that they generate 
(Fernandez et al., 2014; Fernandez & Chiambaretto, 2016; 
Tidström, 2014). This vast literature has identified the key de-
terminants of these strategies but has not provided an inte-
grative framework to study their respective impacts on firms’ 
value creation and appropriation strategies. Furthermore, our 
contribution is one of the first studies that investigates situa-
tions of “asymmetric coopetition” in which partners have 
different sizes and “multipartner coopetition” in which there 
are three or more partners. Therefore, we emphasize the 
importance of the relative sizes (from a budgetary stand-
point) of the partners in explaining value creation and value 
appropriation strategies.
Inevitably, our study has a number of limitations. As with 
any theoretical model, our model is based on a series of 
assumptions that must be discussed. First, our model allows 
firms to use and allocate their budget for value creation or 
value appropriation interchangeably. Most of our results de-
pend on this key assumption of investment substitutability 
across partners. However, resources dedicated by different 
firms to a coopetitive project are rarely perfect substitutes 
and frequently involve complementarities (or synergies) be-
tween resources. It would therefore be of interest to ex-
tend our model to other settings that allow for 
complementarities (e.g., with a multiplicative value creation 
function). Second, our results hold only if the coopetitive 
budgets of partnering firms are observable and common 
knowledge. Future research could consider asymmetric in-
formation among the partnering firms or develop a model 
in which the appropriation efforts are more difficult to ob-
serve than the value creation efforts. Finally, as with any 
theoretical paper, fur ther research is needed to empirically 
assess the validity of our conclusions. This empirical test 
could be conducted either by relying on existing databases 
or by running controlled laboratory experiments.
Nevertheless, this research provides new insights regarding 
the value creation/value appropriation dilemma in coopetition 
strategies for innovation while identifying promising research 
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